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We  analyze  the  communication  network  that  emerged  in  social  media  around  an  international  protest
campaign  launched  in  May  2012.  Applying  insights  from  network  science  and  the theory  of  brokerage,
we  examine  the  cohesion  of  the  network  with  community  detection  methods,  and  identify  the  users  thatocial protests
nline networks
rokerage
tructural constraint
odularity
igital media
spanned  structural  holes,  creating  bridges  for potential  information  diffusion.  We  also  analyze  actual
message  exchange  to assess  how  the  network  was  used  to facilitate  the transmission  of information.
Our ﬁndings  provide  evidence  of  fragmentation  in online  communication  dynamics,  and  of a  distribution
of  brokerage  opportunities  that was  both  uneven  and  underexploited.  We  use these  ﬁndings  to  assess
recent  theoretical  claims  about  political  protests  in  the digital  age.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
The terms ‘networked politics’ and ‘networked social move-
ents’ have become very salient in the study of political protests
nd collective action in the digital age (Bennett and Segerberg,
013; Castells, 2012; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Faris, 2013; Juris,
008). Recent political events – from the Arab Spring or the Occupy
ovement in 2011, to the more recent protests emerging in Turkey,
razil and Hong Kong (2013–2014) – have spurred much interest in
ow online technologies are helping coordinate large numbers of
eople in the absence of central organizations. Theoretical accounts
f those events often rely on implicit assumptions about how online
etworks operate – assumptions that are rarely put to an empir-
cal test and that are often not consistent with well-established
ndings in network science (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; Newman,
010; Newman et al., 2006; Watts, 2003) and the analysis of
ocial networks (Carrington et al., 2005; Diani and McAdam, 2003;
adushin, 2012; Monge and Contractor, 2003; Wasserman and
aust, 1994). This article applies the analytical tools of network
heory to evaluate how online networks mediate collective action
fforts.
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378-8733/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
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Networks reﬂect organic forms of organization and they create a
structure through which information ﬂows (Monge and Contractor,
2003; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A growing body of research
suggests that online networks fall far from the decentralized struc-
tures to which new social movements are often metaphorically
compared. In addition, online technologies offer no guarantee
for a fast and broad diffusion of information: only when the
structure of connections is conducive to chain reactions and cas-
cading effects can online networks encourage diffusion (Easley and
Kleinberg, 2010; Newman, 2010). Most online networks are sparse,
which means that they are organized around structural holes
that hamper diffusion and information spreading. The existence
of bridges spanning those holes and the willingness of informa-
tion brokers to facilitate diffusion are necessary conditions for
information to travel. This requirement is not speciﬁc to online
networks: social research has long identiﬁed the relevance of those
features for diffusion in a number of contexts, including politi-
cal mobilization (Burt, 1992; Gould, 1989; Gould and Fernandez,
1989; Granovetter, 1974; Kim and Bearman, 1997; Rogers, 2003;
Valente, 1995; Watts, 2003). In spite of that evidence, network
mechanisms are barely considered in recent theoretical accounts
that describe how social media is used to organize collective
action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Castells, 2012; Faris, 2013;
Gerbaudo, 2012). As a consequence, an important level of analysis is
disregarded.
This article starts from the premise that, when seen through
an empirical lens, networks are very diverse objects. As such, they
need to be characterized before they can be linked to functions like
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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he spread of information or the emergence of collective action. This
xercise requires analyzing networks as structures of opportunity
hat might (or not) be realized. The analyses that follow show that
he global connectivity often taken for granted in online networks
epends on the existence of bridges (i.e. ties spanning structural
oles) and the existence of brokers activating those connections.
e provide evidence that online networks are highly centralized
nd fragmented, far from the horizontal and ﬂuid structures they
re often assumed to be (Castells, 2009, 2012). We  show that only
 minority of users bring online networks together and facilitate
lobal dissemination in protest communication.
These empirical patterns, and what they reveal about digital
obilization and collective action, are obscured when theoret-
cal accounts use networks as synonyms of ‘social movements’
nd ‘horizontal organizations’. Using network terms as shorthand
or different slices of reality (i.e. social movements, decentralized
ction, communication structures) may  be useful on a descriptive
evel, but it conceals how networks operate in practice. This paper
ocuses on the structure of one speciﬁc online network (Twitter),
nd on how it was activated to disseminate information about one
peciﬁc global campaign (“United for Global Change”, sponsored in
012 by Indignados and Occupy members). The mechanisms and
etwork features identiﬁed in this paper point, however, to generic
rinciples behind the structure and function of many networks –
nd can therefore be generalized beyond our particular case study.
he ability to generalize ﬁndings is core to any research endeavor;
nd it is, we argue, more difﬁcult to attain under recent (but not
ecessarily compatible) theoretical accounts of how social media
acilitates collective action. The following section elaborates on this
oint, ﬂeshing out the conceptual elements behind the theory of
etworks as derived from network science and from studies on
ower.
We derive our working hypotheses from this theoretical dis-
ussion. Section 2 introduces the methods and data employed to
est those hypotheses, and Section 3 presents the empirical ﬁnd-
ngs. The results consider both the structural properties of the
rotest communication network (i.e. the opportunities for infor-
ation ﬂow) and the dynamic use of that structure (i.e. the extent
o which those opportunities were realized to engage in actual com-
unication). The ﬁnal section concludes with a broader theoretical
iscussion of the ﬁndings and with the message that we need a
ore nuanced exploration of the network mechanisms underlying
igital protests if we are to build theories that are both cumulative
nd generalizable.
. The theory of networks
.1. Networks as communication structures
Network theory offers a language and a method to under-
tand patterns of organization and interdependence. Decades of
nalytical and empirical research have contributed to the develop-
ent of the theory, which now stands as a solid common ground
panning many disciplines (Carrington et al., 2005; Monge and
ontractor, 2003; Newman et al., 2006; Wasserman and Faust,
994; Watts, 2003). Communication offers one of the main avenues
or interdependence, creating ties that bring individuals together
nd channels through which information ﬂows. Digital technolo-
ies have accelerated the speed of communication and ampliﬁed
ts reach; they have also made it easier to analyze connections
nd improve our understanding of how networks mediate the
mergence of collective action. From a theoretical point of view,
etworks can be instrumental for two reasons: they open the
aths for information to travel; and they place individuals at the
rossroads of those paths, granting different abilities to control or
romote information ﬂows. Networks 44 (2016) 95–104
Actors with the ability to control the ﬂow of information are,
in network theory parlance, the brokers that create bridges and
help maintain global connectivity. A common deﬁnition of broker-
age in social networks relies on measures of structural constraint
and betweenness centrality: brokers build networks with non-
redundant connections, and they tend to lie in many of the paths
that connect the other nodes in the network (Burt, 1992, 2005;
Freeman, 1977, 1979; Girvan and Newman, 2002; Gould, 1989;
Gould and Fernandez, 1989). Online technologies allegedly allow
anyone with an internet connection to become an information
broker and be in a position to trigger diffusion reactions. Net-
work theory allows testing that assumption while answering two
interrelated questions: How does this potential materialize? And
what are the implications for how information ﬂows online? In our
context, the diffusion of information is relevant because it helps
organize protests.
The idea that bridges in a network have important consequences
for information ﬂow is at least as old as the strength of weak
ties argument (Granovetter, 1973). Weak ties bring socially dis-
tant groups together: they link parts of the network that would be
unconnected (or less well connected) in their absence. The mea-
sure of structural constraint builds on this idea in the context of
organizations: actors that span structural holes have lower con-
straint and are in a better position to manage information ﬂow (Aral
and Van Alstyne, 2011; Burt, 1992, 2005). When networks can be
partitioned according to discrete categories (e.g. supporters of dif-
ferent causes or members of different organizations), the notion
of brokerage adopts an additional dimension: it helps identify the
actors that build bridges across groups, creating opportunities for
information to travel beyond clusters of redundant communication
(Gould, 1989; Gould and Fernandez, 1989). As Gould put it, “it may
be misleading to analyze social structures under the assumption
that all social ties have the same analytical status. Communication
across sub-groups (. . .)  may  have profound effects on the rela-
tive power of individuals in social networks, while communication
within such groups may  be so frequent or unproblematic that its
structure affords no insight into social processes” (Gould, 1989).
The idea, in other words, is that the notion of brokerage can incor-
porate a criterion to group nodes in clusters where information is
likely to be redundant.
Community detection methods offer a data-driven approach to
such classiﬁcation (Girvan and Newman, 2002; Newman, 2012).
These methods also rely on the idea of betweenness but applied
to the edges, not the nodes, which helps identify structural holes
on a larger scale, i.e. beyond personal networks. Prior research sug-
gests that communities identiﬁed on the basis of network structure
often respond to exogenous attributes like ideological alignment
or afﬁliations (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover et al., 2011;
Grabowicz et al., 2012; Traud et al., 2011). Identifying communities
in a network is important because they might make global infor-
mation ﬂows more difﬁcult to attain: the relative absence of ties
across communities means that information will, more often than
not, be trapped in the areas of higher internal density.
Summing up, previous work suggests that networks facili-
tate the diffusion of information if some actors – the brokers –
integrate with their ties communities and clusters. In the con-
text of social movements, the absence of brokers means that
networks would break into isolated components, separated by
political or social barriers. Bridges, on the other hand, create
paths for information diffusion – if and when they are activated.
These bridges can be local, as captured by measures like struc-
tural constraint; or global, as captured by community detection
methods. In addition, actors occupying brokerage positions need
to engage in actual exchange to become information brokers.
Networks afford but do not determine dynamics of information
diffusion.
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.2. Networks as power structures
Controlling information ﬂow grants power. This is the idea at
he core of recent theoretical accounts of how digital technologies
re transforming social movements and collective action – most
rominently, the theories proposed by Castells (2009, 2012) and
ennett and Segerberg (2013). Online networks of communication,
heir argument goes, have ﬂattened and decentralized the ﬂow of
nformation; as a consequence, they have helped undermine the
ld asymmetries that gave prominence to an elite of gatekeepers.
his basic argument is elaborated under the rubric of two different
heories: the theory of communication power (Castells, 2009) and
he logic of connective action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013), which
ffer alternative stories of why online networks are transforming
ocial movements.
In Castells’ approach, power relies on the ability to shape the
inds of the public (Castells, 2009). This implies that “power is
ased on the control of communication and information, be it the
acro-power of the state and media corporations or the micro-
ower of organizations of all sorts” (Castells, 2009, p. 3). According
o this account, there are four types of power in contemporary
ocieties. The ﬁrst, “networking power”, refers to how actors and
rganizations that are included in global networks have power over
hose who are not included; the second, “network power”, refers
o asymmetries that result from coordinating standards: power
s exercised not by exclusion from networks but by an imposi-
ion of inclusion rules; the third, “networked power”, refers to
he power that some social actors have over other actors in the
ame communication network; and ﬁnally, there is the “network-
aking power”, which results from the ability to build and program
etworks according to the interests and values of the “program-
ers” (Castells, 2009, pp. 42–47). This last form of power, the theory
ustains, is the most crucial in contemporary societies and core to
hat Castells calls “networked social movements”.
Other than changing the inﬂection of the word ‘network’, how-
ver, there is nothing in this conceptualization that allow us to
haracterize the role that networks play in communication dynam-
cs. In a description of his network theory, Castells claims: “Of
ourse, networks are formed by actors in their networking arrange-
ents. But who these actors are and what their networks are is a
atter of the speciﬁc conﬁguration of networks in each particular
ontext and in each particular process (. . .)  Who  does what, how,
here, and why through this multipronged networking strategy
s a matter for investigation, not for formal theorization” (Castells,
011, p. 786). His more recent account of the Arab Spring, the ‘Indig-
ados’ movement, and the Occupy campaign, however, does not
ffer that kind of investigation (Castells, 2012). The organizational
bility of online networks is taken for granted, and no evidence
s provided on how they enhance (or hamper) connectivity and
nformation ﬂow. Instead, the theory is distilled into claims such us
Movements are viral, following the logic of the Internet networks”
Castells, 2012, p. 224) or “the horizontality of networks supports
ooperation and solidarity while undermining the need for formal
eadership” (Castells, 2012, p. 225). These claims stand in opposi-
ion to much empirical evidence produced by network research and
he analysis of online communication.
In Bennett and Segerberg’s approach, on the other hand, com-
unication becomes a new form of organization (Bennett and
egerberg, 2012). Digital technologies, they claim, demand chang-
ng the traditional paradigms used to explain collective action.
hese paradigms highlight the importance of resource mobiliza-
ion, rational decision making, and the constant pondering of the
osts and beneﬁts of collective action; digital technologies, they
rgue, demand a theory that moves away from these notions
nd highlights, instead, the new logic of “connective action”.
his new logic results from large-scale personalized and digitally Networks 44 (2016) 95–104 97
mediated political engagement: “ideas and mechanisms for orga-
nizing action become more personalized than in cases where action
is organized on the basis of social group identity, membership, or
ideology” (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012, p. 744). Communication
networks, the theory goes, articulate this type of personalized poli-
tics; but again, the theory does not provide guidance to characterize
networks as they facilitate (or not) organized action. A theory that
sees in networks the backbone of social and political life would ben-
eﬁt greatly from a more accurate inspection of how those networks
form and function.
Other recent accounts of protests and contentious action depart
from these theoretical constructs to add more empirical nuance
to the claim that online networks and social media empower
individuals. Gerbaudo’s account of the Arab Spring, the ‘Indigna-
dos’ in Spain, and the Occupy campaign, for instance, challenges
the assumption that these were leaderless movements (Gerbaudo,
2012). As he claims, “far from inaugurating a situation of abso-
lute ‘leaderlessness’, social media have in fact facilitated the rise of
complex and ‘liquid’ or ‘soft’ forms of leadership which exploit the
interactive and participatory character of the new communication
technologies” (Gerbaudo, 2012, Chapter 1). An alternative study
of the 2011 Egyptian protests argues that social media networks
“can trigger informational cascades through the effects of their
interaction with independent media outlets and on-the ground
organizers” (Faris, 2013, p. 22). And yet another study on the Egyp-
tian mobilizations showed that social media use had a positive
impact on the decision to protest (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012); the
argument relies once more on the assumption that online networks
facilitated information ﬂow.
Overall, a review of the literature suggests that the language
of networks has become common currency in different attempts
to understand social movements in the digital age; however,
abstractions and metaphors need to be translated into concrete
operationalizations if they are to serve an explanatory purpose.
Networks vary drastically in their properties and functionalities;
claiming that we live in the age of networks offers little information
if we  do not also provide a richer picture of what those networks
look like and how they allow individual actors to communicate and
organize. The theoretical accounts just described are too ambiguous
in their terminology to give a precise answer to those questions.
2.3. Research questions
The analysis of protest communication through online networks
requires examining three levels of analysis: the global structure of
the network; the local positions of individual actors; and the actual
ﬂow of information through those connections. Our ﬁrst ques-
tion focuses on the global level. Prior research suggests that many
networks can be characterized by gaps separating areas of densely
connected clusters (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; Newman, 2010).
The ﬁrst step in our analyses determines whether the presence
of structural holes is a signiﬁcant feature in the protest campaign
network. This question is theoretically important because struc-
tural holes create bottlenecks that can limit information diffusion,
especially if the holes respond to constraints imposed by ofﬂine
factors like afﬁliation to local groups (Breiger, 1974; Feld, 1981).
If those factors crystalize in the form of sub-networks with higher
internal density of connections, information ﬂow risks being locally
bounded.
The second question focuses on the individual level, that is,
on the positions that speciﬁc actors have in the overall network.
We are interested in the distribution of those positions and, in
particular, in the degree of heterogeneity in brokerage poten-
tial. We contend that actors that have brokerage positions are
more important for the global exchange of information. Follow-
ing the theoretical discussion above, we differentiate two types of
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rokerage: one based on the local deﬁnition of constraint (Burt,
992); the other based on the global deﬁnition derived from com-
unity detection (Girvan and Newman, 2002). The theories of
etwork power discussed above presume that online networks are
attening access to brokerage; however, alternative accounts of
ecent mobilizations suggest that self-organized movements also
roduce leadership structures (Gerbaudo, 2012). Our second ques-
ion aims to test whether there were any visible heads in the
ampaign we analyze, as assessed by the brokerage potential of
articipants and the prominence conferred to them by other con-
ributors to the network.
Finally, the third question focuses on the more dynamic level of
ctual information ﬂow. It aims to operationalize the claim made
bove that networks offer opportunity structures that need to be
ealized. Our ﬁrst two questions consider the network structure and
he opportunities it affords; this third question is about how those
pportunities are materialized in the actual exchange of protest
nformation. We  hypothesize that communication networks offer
rokerage opportunities that are not exploited, which creates addi-
ional constraints on the ability of online networks to diffuse
nformation. While previous research suggests that the structural
roperties of networks are important to understand the dynamics
f information ﬂow, it also offers evidence that the structure alone
annot always explain diffusion (Carrington et al., 2005; Newman
t al., 2006; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Watts, 1999). This is
ecause networks respond to exogenous factors that depend on the
olitical context, but also because networks ultimately respond to
ndividual decisions: being in a position to broker information does
ot necessarily lead to brokerage behavior.
These research questions derive from network theory and prior
esearch on brokerage in social networks. The analyses below offer
n empirical lens to understand how social media operates, given
he constraints and opportunities it affords to users. The goal is
o shed light on dynamics that are obscured when theories are
eveloped on a level of abstraction that precludes the empirical
nalysis of networks. Overall, our questions aim to reconstruct the
natomy of protest campaigns as they materialize in social media.
ur main assumption is that social media creates channels for infor-
ation exchange that can be instrumental in the coordination of
ocial movements. The argument does not imply that decentral-
zed forms of organization (or social movements, in general) can
e reduced to a single layer of communication; rather, it suggests
hat analyzing the structure and dynamics of online networks can
lluminate the mechanisms of self-organization that characterize
ew forms of collective action. In this sense, the mechanisms we
dentify transcend the use of any particular social media platform.
. Data and methods
.1. Case study: the ‘Indignados’ and Occupy
We  focus on the communication network linking the ‘Indigna-
os’ and Occupy movements as manifested in the use of social
edia (Twitter in particular). Both movements made instrumen-
al use of social media to recruit sympathizers and participants,
nd to coordinate their calls for action (Andersen, 2011; Castells,
012; Gerbaudo, 2012). These movements also converged several
imes since their emergence in 2011 to ally in the organization of
lobal campaigns and to exchange information about strategies and
actics.
The ‘Indignados’ brewed up online in the early months of 2011.
he movement rose as a response to the politics of austerity
mposed by the Spanish government in the aftermath of the ﬁnan-
ial crisis. It was partly fueled by the uprisings in the Middle East,
specially Egypt, which became a source of inspiration for many Networks 44 (2016) 95–104
protesters. There were, however, many local precedents and cam-
paigns that also gave muscle to the movement. The online platform
Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy Now) emerged as a network
of blogs and online platforms that gravitated around a discussion
group in Facebook. The platform and their manifesto gained a lot
of attention through networks like Facebook and Twitter, which
played a signiﬁcant role in attracting interest and promoting con-
versations among protesters, journalists, and sympathizers.
A demonstration day was planned for May  15, a week prior to
regional and municipal elections. This call was supported online by
thousands of individuals and by hundreds of civil society organiza-
tions. On demonstration day, it also received the ofﬂine support of
hundreds of thousands of protesters who turned up in the streets
of many cities around the country. After the demonstration, some
protesters decided to camp in public squares until the date for
municipal elections, which were to take place throughout the coun-
try on May  22. During that week, the visibility of the movement
in mainstream media grew exponentially, and so did online activ-
ity (Borge-Holthoefer et al., 2011; Vanilla-Rodirguez et al., 2012).
Election Day arrived, and after that, the movement started to wind
down. The camps were dismantled, and online networks entered a
dormant phase.
These protests left behind a trail that was to lead to the
emergence of the Occupy movement. When the Canadian activist
magazine Adbusters launched a call in July of 2011 to occupy Wall
Street, the idea was to exploit the tactics introduced by the Egyp-
tian uprising and the Spanish ‘Indignados’ and encourage “a fusion
of Tahrir with the acampadas of Spain” (Adbusters, 2011). The call
established September 17 as the date for action and during the
intervening months online networks were targeted with messages
(and #OccupyWallStreet hashtags) and symbolic imagery, includ-
ing the famous picture of the ballerina posing on the back of the
Charging Bull in the ﬁnancial district of Manhattan.
The beginnings of the Occupy movement are different from
the ‘Indignados’ because it was originally orchestrated by estab-
lished (albeit alternative) news media. Only when organizers on
the ground got involved, which included groups from the anarchist
scene of New York but also other grassroots and community-based
organizations, did the movement start to consolidate and grow.
Other online groups, like the hacktivist Anonymous, helped spread
the message through online networks, and the Spanish ‘Indignados’
contributed to the spread of the Occupy call as early as July. This
created the ﬁrst explicit alliance between the two movements.
The estimated number of people gathering in Manhattan on
September 17 ranges from 1000 to 5000 – which fell far from the
original target of mobilizing 20,000 people. The movement spread
to other cities in the U.S. only after some violent police reactions
and the massive arrests that followed the Brooklyn Bridge march
on October 1. The dynamics of that spatial diffusion reveal high lev-
els of locality in the patterns of communication and a very unequal
distribution in the allocation of attention, which was  absorbed by a
small number of locations, namely New York, California, and Wash-
ington, D.C. (Conover et al., 2013). After these events, the movement
and their slogan (“we are the 99%”) became a global phenomenon.
Again, Facebook and Twitter were essential tools for commu-
nication and mobilization – to the point that some protesters felt
uneasy for depending so much on proprietary tools, in conﬂict with
the openness of the movement (Castells, 2012, p. 175). A second
explicit connection linking the Occupy and the ‘Indignados’ protests
came with the international call for action planned for October 15,
2011 under the slogan “United for Global Change”. Mobilizations
were organized in more than 900 cities in 85 different countries
around the world. Many of these protests resulted in new camps.
Since then, and with the camp sites ultimately dismantled, the
movements were dormant for a few months and not very vis-
ible ofﬂine. They were still active in online networks, although
S. González-Bailón, N. Wang / Social Networks 44 (2016) 95–104 99
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of communication networks.
Following/
follower
RTs @Mentions
N (number of vertices) 125,222 85,307 60,485
E  (number of directed edges) 8,510,654 178,781 132,431
〈d〉  (mean degree) 136 4 4
Max  (kin) (maximum indegree) 27,518 3,930 1584
Max  (kout) (maximum outdegree) 9047 912 600
q  (reciprocity) 0.489 0.026 0.036
C  (mean transitivity or clustering) 0.181 0.113 0.226
r  (degree correlation coefﬁcient) −0.139 −0.065 −0.094
#  Components 41 3485 3574
account the overall structure of the network making use of com-Fig. 1. Schematic representation of networks analyzed.
ith lower frequency of communication. The noise started to build
p again as the date of the ﬁrst anniversary of the ‘Indignados’
pproached, and a new international call for action was planned for
ay  12, 2012, again under the slogan “United for Global Change”.
his is the protest we analyze here. We  chose this case because it
ffers a good example of international mobilization through online
etworks when there is no clear ofﬂine organizational structure. In
ddition, a lot of attention has been paid in the literature to these
ovements and to how they used social media; our case selection
as also informed by the empirical focus of that prior work.
.2. Networks and metrics
We  collected data during the period 30 April to 30 May  using the
witter search API, querying for messages that contained the top
ve hashtags related to the ‘Indignados’ movement, identiﬁed in
revious work (González-Bailón et al., 2011), and variations of the
ord ‘occupy*’. A total of 445,153 messages were collected. Because
ashtags are often co-used, these messages contained many other
ashtags we  did not include in the original search list (close to
0 thousand). Using hashtags as a proxy to content, in line with
he convention devised by Twitter users themselves, we classiﬁed
essages as being related to the ‘Indignados’ or to the Occupy cam-
aigns. Many messages contained hashtags relevant for the two
ovements.
Every message in our sample is linked to a unique user ID, which
e used to snowball the following/follower structure. The one-step
nowball crawl returned a network of more than 38 million users;
f these, we only retained users that had sent at least one protest
essage during the period we observe, as well as their connections
o other users that were also involved in protest communication.
n addition, we parsed the messages to identify re-tweets (RTs)
nd mentions (@), which allowed us to reconstruct direct interac-
ions and explicit channels of protest information ﬂow. These three
etworks are nested layers of the same communication structure,
s illustrated in Fig. 1.
To answer our ﬁrst question, we only use the following-follower
etwork (layer A): structural holes are deﬁned at this level of
nteraction, which offers the basic opportunity structure for com-
unication in this platform. Our second question, on the other
and, requires the three levels of analysis: our measures of bro-
erage are calculated using the following-follower network (layer
); but our deﬁnition of centrality in the ﬂow of information reliesN  giant component 125,135 76,538 51,505
N  2nd largest component 4 53 76
on activity in layers B and C. Finally, our third question considers
activity on the networks that unfold in layers B and C.
The network statistics for these three networks are summarized
in Table 1. They reveal that, as is usual in most online networks,
centrality is distributed very unevenly: a minority of users con-
centrates most of the connections, and again a minority attracts
and sends most of the messages (the maximum values compared
to mean degree is indicative of the underlying long tailed dis-
tribution). The networks, however, are highly connected, with
most users being part of a single giant component. In the analy-
ses that follow, we use the follower network to identify bridges
and structural brokers; we use the RTs and mentions networks
to assess the extent to which those brokerage opportunities were
realized.
For each user we have the number of messages sent, and a count
of how many were intended for the Occupy audience (i.e. used vari-
ations of the Occupy* hashtag), and how many were intended for
the ‘Indignados’ (i.e. used hashtags related to the Spanish protests).
We used this count to classify users as afﬁliated to one of the
two protest groups. Because our observation window includes the
demonstrations to celebrate the ﬁrst anniversary of the ‘Indigna-
dos’, there is more activity on that side of the network and as a
consequence more users are classiﬁed in this group (N = 74,007);
the rest are classiﬁed as users communicating mostly about the
Occupy movement (N = 51,212). Our data does not allow us to
determine whether these patterns of communication signal real
afﬁliation to the ofﬂine movements (for instance, in the form of
users actually protesting in the streets). However, our questions
are not about how online activity translates into ofﬂine action,
but instead about how online networks facilitate information
ﬂow.
Following the theoretical discussion above, we identify the bro-
kers in the network using two  structural deﬁnitions: one focusing
on the local characteristics of personal networks; the second focus-
ing on the modularity of the overall structure. The local deﬁnition
employs the measure of structural constraint (Burt, 1992, Chapter
2; Burt, 2004, p. 362, n. 6). Constraint helps identify the nodes that
are in a position to span structural holes in personal networks: it is a
measure of local density and redundancy in connections. In the con-
text of Twitter, the constraint of a user is higher if the user has less
contacts, or the contacts are mutually connected (so connections
in their personal networks are redundant); it is lower if a user is
connected to other users that are not following each other (which
means that the user has the possibility to span structural holes).
A lower constraint indicates that an actor has higher brokerage
opportunities.
The second deﬁnition of brokerage zooms out and takes intomunity detection algorithms. These methods partition the network
in groups according to patterns in the density of connections. The
approach assumes that users that are part of the same group will
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ave more internal links, which offers a bottom-up strategy to
dentify communities (and the holes that separate them) using
he network structure itself. Classic methods for community detec-
ion use the betweenness of edges (Newman, 2012). The method
rst removes the edges that have higher betweenness scores and
ounts the number of communities that emerge as a result (that
s, the number of unconnected sub-networks that result from the
emoval); it then iterates the process until there are as many com-
unities as nodes in the network (i.e. all edges are removed). Going
ack through all the iterations, this method ﬁnds the best partition
o classify nodes in dense groups.
The best partition is the classiﬁcation that maximizes the modu-
arity score, a coefﬁcient that quantiﬁes the strength of community
tructure by measuring how separated the groups are from each
ther. This score measures the fraction of all edges in the network
hat connect nodes in the same group minus the expected value
n a network with the same classiﬁcation but random connections.
he expected value provides the benchmark or null model against
hich to test the signiﬁcance of the community structure observed
n networks. If the number of connections within groups is no better
han random, the modularity score is Q = 0; as the score approaches
 = 1, the evidence that the network has a community structure
ecomes stronger. In practice, most values fall in the range from
.3 to 0.7, which higher values being rarely observed (Newman
nd Girvan, 2004). According to this, a value above 0.5 can be inter-
reted as a signiﬁcant departure from randomness and thus as
vidence of community structure and the existence of structural
oles.
Betweenness methods have high computational costs and are
ot efﬁcient for networks that have more than a few thousand
odes. Because of the size of our data, we apply three alternative
ethods that are designed for large networks: fast greedy commu-
ity detection (Clauset et al., 2004), label propagation (Raghavan
t al., 2007), and network mapping based on the probability of
nformation diffusion (Rosvall and Bergstrom, 2008; see also Csárdi
nd Nepusz, 2006 for details on implementation of these methods).
he ﬁrst two methods are still based on the assumption that con-
ections should be denser inside groups than outside groups. The
nformation mapping approach, by contrast, introduces a concep-
ual change by identifying communities not on the basis of patterns
f connections but on how those connections would allow infor-
ation to ﬂow. Unlike the other two methods, this approach takes
nto account the directionality of links. Our analyses compare the
onsistency of these three classiﬁcations, and uses the modularity
cores to assess the signiﬁcance of the fragmentation.
Finally, we assess the extent to which these structural oppor-
unities for brokerage are realized by looking at cross-posting
ehavior and at the ﬂow of RTs and mentions. Although we  clas-
ify users as ‘mostly Indignados’ or ‘mostly Occupy’ by counting the
umber of messages they send showing the corresponding hash-
ags, a minority of them (about 6.45% of all users, N = 8082) posted at
east one message relevant for the two audiences. We  label these
sers ‘information brokers’ to explicitly compare them with the
structural brokers’ (that is, users that have low constraint, or that
ridge holes across communities). We  also look at RTs and mentions
o determine if both structural and information brokers are more
isible and central in the actual ﬂow of information – a precondition
f global diffusion is to be channeled by the network.
. Results
The results that follow consider both the structural properties of
he communication network (i.e. the opportunities for information
ow) and the dynamic use of that structure (i.e. the extent to which
hose opportunities are realized). Each section considers one of the
hree research questions introduced above. Networks 44 (2016) 95–104
4.1. Bridges and structural holes
The ﬁrst question aims to evaluate whether the network used
for protest communication is built around structural holes. Evi-
dence supporting the presence of structural holes is theoretically
important because those holes restrict the number of channels
that can be activated for information ﬂow. Fig. 2 shows the out-
puts of the three community detection algorithms described in the
methods section; in particular, the ﬁgure displays the ﬁve largest
communities, how they connect to each other, and the associated
modularity score Q. Each community is represented by a pie chart
that summarizes its composition in terms of movement afﬁliation
(Fig. 2, panels 1a–3a) and in terms of presence of ‘information
brokers’, that is, users sending messages relevant for both audi-
ences (Fig. 2, panels 1b–3b). The goal of these analyses is to shed
light on whether structural holes reﬂect ofﬂine afﬁliations and
whether information brokers are concentrated on one part of the
network.
According to the label propagation method, the network can
be split in 61 communities (M), although 99.8% of users are classi-
ﬁed in the top ﬁve (Ntop5). The fast greedy approach results in 123
communities, although again a high percentage of users (99.6%) are
assigned to the main ﬁve communities. The information mapping
approach departs more signiﬁcantly from the other two: it results
in a higher number of communities, with the top ﬁve containing
just above half of all users (53.2%). This departure is not surprising
given that the method, as explained in the previous section, takes
into account the directionality of links: it assigns users to commu-
nities depending on how easy information can ﬂow among them.
The information ﬂow approach offers, for this reason, an inter-
esting insight into how the network can operate as a conduit for
diffusion. More communities means that there are more structural
holes in the network – and therefore more bottlenecks affecting
information ﬂow.
In spite of these differences, the three methods offer a simi-
lar picture of the divide that exists across the ‘Indignados’ and
Occupy side of the network. Information brokers (the minority
of users posting messages relevant for both sides) are repre-
sented in most of these groups, which means that brokerage
opportunities as afforded by the structure are potentially real-
ized from all sides of the divide. The modularity scores Q for
the three methods, however, suggest that the community struc-
ture (and the presence of structural holes) is very characteristic
of this network – that is, the observed levels of fragmentation
depart signiﬁcantly from the expectation under the assumption
of a null, random model of network formation. These commu-
nities reveal an organizational logic that cannot be reduced to
chance, and (as the composition of the pie charts show) is not
independent of exogenous factors like language or geographical
distance.
4.2. Structural brokers
The second question tests whether users spanning structural
holes are more central, inﬂuential, and visible than other users,
forming an elite in the network of communication. The commu-
nity detection approach discussed in the previous section allows
us to identify the global brokers, that is, users spanning the struc-
tural holes separating communities on the meso-level. In addition,
we can also identify the local brokers, that is, users who have low
structural constraint in their personal networks and can poten-
tially act as mediators amongst their neighbors. Fig. 3 summarizes
the association between these two  measures of brokerage and
centrality, inﬂuence, and visibility as measured by the number of
followers, the number of re-tweets, and the number of mentions
received.
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Fig. 2. Structural holes and community composition.
Fig. 3. Association of brokerage (local and global) and centrality.
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The scatterplots in Fig. 3, panels 1a–3a focus on the local mea-
ure of brokerage (data points are binned to avoid cluttering; darker
olors signal higher frequencies). The ﬁrst plot reveals a substan-
ive and signiﬁcant association between brokerage and indegree
entrality (Spearman’s rank correlation r = −0.88, 99% bootstrapped
onﬁdence intervals, CI = −0.886, −0.881). This means that users
ith larger audiences tend to span more local holes in their per-
onal networks – not surprisingly, given that the size of networks
ffects how constraint is calculated. However, the association of
ocal brokerage with inﬂuence is very weak (r = −0.30, CI = −0.313,
0.295); it is also weak for visibility (r = −0.38, CI = −0.395, −0.373).
his means that being a local broker is associated only slightly to
rominence in the exchange of information.
Structural brokers as deﬁned by the global measure, on the other
and, are signiﬁcantly more central, inﬂuential and visible than
sers who do not bridge structural holes (Fig. 3, panels 1b–3b; the
oxplots omit outliers to ease visualization). The red dots show the
bserved difference in the upper quartiles; for the case of inde-
ree centrality, the 99% CI of the difference is so small that it is
arely visible (CI = 77, 82); for the case of inﬂuence and visibil-
ty, all boostrapped samples produced the same difference. The
agnitude of the difference is not very substantive, but of course,
ost divergence takes place in the right tail of the distribution,
hich is longer for structural brokers. What this means is that
sers spanning structural holes at the global level are dispropor-
ionately better connected both in the network of followers in the
ore dynamic exchange of information via mentions and RTs. This
inority of users in the tail of the distribution forms the elite that
eeps the network together.
.3. Information ﬂow
The third question investigates what extent the brokerage
pportunities offered by online networks are realized. The answer
o this question is relevant because a poor activation of ties would
xacerbate the limits imposed by structural holes to the ability to
iffuse information. The ﬁndings discussed in the previous section
howed that structural brokers, deﬁned globally, are more visible
han other users; but to what extent are they instrumental in dif-
using information relevant for both audiences? Only about 10% of
ll the users creating bridges are information brokers, that is, they
mploy hashtags relevant for both the ‘Indignados’ and Occupy
ides of the network. This suggests that there is a large number
f users spanning holes across communities that do not engage
n communication relevant for both audiences. Put differently, the
se of the network reveals missed opportunities to promote global
nformation ﬂows.
Information brokers are a small minority of all users, and also
 minority of the subset of users who span structural holes. The
eﬁnition of information brokers, however, assumes that hashtags
re a good proxy for content that is relevant for both movements.
nother way to look at cross-group information ﬂow is by analyzing
he exchange of RTs and mentions, regardless of the hashtags used.
Ts and mentions are the conventions used by Twitter users to
roadcast information previously published by other users, or to
ngage in direct communication with them. Fig. 4 summarizes how
any of the RTs and mentions that are generated stay inside each
f the two groups, and how many travel to the other side of the
etwork.
Panels 1a and 2a in Fig. 4 show that most information ﬂows
tay within the groups: only a tiny fraction of all RTs create com-
unication channels from Occupy to ‘Indignados’ and vice versa.n the case of mentions (panel 2a), users on the Indignados side
ngage more frequently with users on the Occupy side – probably
o gain their attention; however, their reaching out is not recip-
ocated by the Occupy audience. The difference between observed Networks 44 (2016) 95–104
and expected frequencies is statistically signiﬁcant according to the
Chi-squared test of independence (99% level). Panels 1b and 2b plot
the standardized residuals for the cells in the contingency table;
they conﬁrm that there is substantially more exchange of informa-
tion within each group than expected by chance, especially so in the
case of RTs, which offer the main channel for information diffusion
in this online network.
5. Discussion
The ﬁndings above provide evidence that protest communica-
tion networks are fragmented in ways that hamper the diffusion of
information; that only a minority of users have the ability to bridge
the structural holes in the network; and that only a few of those
bridges are activated to allow information to ﬂow from cluster to
cluster. Our ﬁndings suggest that global brokerage is more impor-
tant than local brokerage to identify pivotal actors in the exchange
of information; the ﬁndings also reveal that online networks are not
that different compared to other ofﬂine networks when it comes
to creating the conditions for information ﬂow: structural holes
still need to be bridged, and the ties bridging those holes still
need to be activated. In this sense, online networks are representa-
tive of wider communication structures, including more traditional
forms of social networks – which have always created channels for
recruitment and information ﬂow (Gould, 1991; Lohmann, 1994;
McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). Communication networks reproduce
social distance in the form of fragmentation or lack of connections;
and, as the ﬁndings reported here show, online networks are not
an exception to that rule. The relevant theoretical question then
is not how digital technologies are changing the logic of collective
action, but whether and how they are changing the structure of
communication networks. Determining the nature of that change
is a logically prior step before an argument can be made on how
social movements operate in the digital age.
Many of the accounts on how social media have changed col-
lective action and political protest rely on arguments that border
technological determinism. Distributed technologies afford many
things, but users employ those technologies to build speciﬁc types
of networks, and they use those networks in a way  that does not
necessarily exploit their diffusion potential. This paper has shown
that online networks are not as ﬂuid as the literature often implies;
that only a few users span structural holes of low density; and that
only a few of these users engage in actual information exchange.
Most communication, our ﬁndings show, remains enclosed within
clusters of redundant connections. Acknowledging this fact waters
down some of the early enthusiastic claims celebrating digital tech-
nologies as revolutionary tools; it offers a more sober point of
departure to decode how individuals form their political identi-
ties and decide to take part in collective action. In the end, groups
and collective identities still shape much exposure to information,
and these are not determined by communication alone but by the
larger political context and institutional arrangements (Anduiza
et al., 2012). One way in which the network approach helps advance
our theoretical understanding of collective action is by analyzing
dynamics of information diffusion as one important element within
a larger, more complex picture. Theories that conﬂate different lev-
els of analysis with a metaphorical use of network terms only make
it more difﬁcult to advance in that understanding – and go beyond
the now abused claim that communication networks help people
self-organize in the absence of formal organizations.
One could argue that the network analyzed here considers only
one of the multiple layers of communication in which protesters
and sympathizers engage; and that, were we  to take into consid-
eration all the other layers of information exchange that exist, the
picture would look different – more aligned with recent theoretical
S. González-Bailón, N. Wang / Social Networks 44 (2016) 95–104 103
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ccounts of social movements and political protests (Bennett and
egerberg, 2013; Castells, 2012). Perhaps, but that is in any case an
mpirical question that requires an even more sophisticated analy-
is of how different networks of communication interact with each
ther. Developing our theories of networked collective action at a
evel of abstraction that does not differentiate networks for their
eatures does not offer a very useful starting point to start tackling
hat question.
In addition, the mechanisms we identify here are generic to
ny network, which helps build continuity with prior research and
heories exploring the role that networks play in the growth of
ocial movements (Diani and McAdam, 2003). Digital technologies
ave not changed the basic social processes that underlie commu-
ication and the ﬂow of information; they have not changed the
echanisms that encourage people to join a collective action effort.
hat technologies have changed is the speed and the reach of com-
unication; but, as our ﬁndings show, we can assume very little
bout the nature of that change without conducting speciﬁc anal-
ses. In the absence of those analyses, theories can only speculate
bout why digital networks are so important for the organization
f collective action.
Our ﬁndings also point to open questions that require further
ttention: How do changes in the structure of protest networks
ffect diffusion dynamics and the growth of movements? Are there
etter network metrics to identify pivotal actors? How does the
tructural positions of actors relate to their roles within social
ovements? How stable are those positions and roles over time?
re protest networks able to recover from attrition or fatigue? Solv-
ng these and other related questions requires more empirical work
 no single research project can tackle them all at the same time.
ut adopting the analytical language of networks, and assessing
etworks as empirical objects, gives us the tools to confront thoseeen Occupy and Indignados.
questions in a way  that more abstract theoretical approaches do
not allow, encouraging a cumulative growth of knowledge that
transcends attention to speciﬁc case studies.
Future research should consider other cases where online
networks have also mediated the organization of political protests,
for instance the protests that emerged in Turkey in May  2013 or
the more recent protests emerging in Hong Kong in December 2014.
The political context surrounding these events is very different, but
the network approach helps identify a common ground for com-
parative research: it can shed light on how similar the networks
underlying those events were, and whether their activation pat-
terns differed in any signiﬁcant way. These features can then be
associated with the speciﬁc details of the political context and the
support provided by the respective civil societies.
The question of how online dynamics relate to ofﬂine action
remains on the table (Golder and Macy, 2014). We could argue
that the protest analyzed here did not attain the same repercus-
sion as the previous call for action (“United for Global Change”,
October 2011) because of the fractured communication dynam-
ics we  identify. Of course, the success or failure of social protests
does not depend exclusively on communication dynamics – the
larger social context matters greatly, among other things because
social media use responds strongly to that context. But if mas-
sive coordination depends on an effective diffusion of information,
then the theoretical approach we follow in this paper gives us
the criteria to differentiate episodes of collective action – instead
of lumping them all together under the labels ‘networked social
movements’ (Castells, 2012) or ‘the logic of connective action’
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2013). Networks are always present, both
in cases of success and in cases of failure; the interesting ques-
tion is under what conditions networks are more conducive to
success.
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. Conclusions
The study of contentious politics in the digital age abounds
n network talk, as recently expressed in inﬂuential theoretical
ccounts of political protests under the rubric of “the logic of con-
ective action” (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012) and “networked
ocial movements” (Castells, 2012). This paper has argued that, to
dvance in that theoretical discussion, the language of networks
as to be made analytical, building on a long tradition of network
esearch and empirical ﬁndings. A nuanced and analytical method-
logy is required to disentangle the ways in which communication
etworks allow information to ﬂow – or trap it, instead, within
he boundaries of local communities. The ﬁndings reported in this
aper suggest that the global connectivity of social media networks
s undermined by structural holes that only a minority of users
ridge. We  have assessed the theoretical implications of these ﬁnd-
ngs, and defended a more cumulative approach to the analysis of
ow communication networks mediate collective action.
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